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Abstract 
 
In this contribution, we focus on the role of euro-scepticism in electoral outcomes of national 
elections. We do so through multilevel multinomial modelling on high-quality cross-national 
European data to explain voting for different party families. We distinguish voting for far left-
wing parties, far right-wing parties, as well as non-voting, versus voting for the other parties. 
First, we focus on social cleavages related to voting. We test for the effects of traditional 
cleavages related to educational attainment, social class, income and religiosity on voting 
preferences. Second, we take diverse socio-political attitudes into account, previously 
proposed to determine voting preferences. We test whether political euro-scepticism affects 
voting preferences over and beyond these attitudinal determinants. We find that political euro-
scepticism and distrust in the European Parliament contribute to the explanation of  extreme 
political preferences. These effects hold after controlling for a general left-right dimension. 
Moreover, euro-scepticism explains why lower income categories and lower educated people 
are more likely to vote for the far right-wing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘A sleeping giant’ is how Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) expect the theme of the ‘European 
Union’ to be typified in the near future elections of the various European nation states. In the 
European Elections of 2004, various euro-sceptic or outspokenly anti-EU parties already 
accomplished electoral successes. The British UK Independence party received wide support 
(16.8%). In the Netherlands, criticism from van Buitenen on EU bureaucracy was rewarded 
with 7.3% of the Dutch votes in the European elections. Other specific euro-critical parties 
were successful in Austria (Liste Martin; 14%), Denmark (JuniBevaegelsen; 9.1%) and 
Sweden (Junilistan; 14.4%). Once again, these elections were plagued with notoriously high 
percentages of Europeans that actually abstained from voting. In 2004, on average 45.6% of 
the Europeans made their way to the voting booths. Low extremes were noted in the new 
member states; Poland (20.9%), Czech Republic (28.3%) and Slovenia (28.3%). 
In national elections it is less clear to what extent mobilization of anti-EU sentiments plays a 
role. Based on expert survey data on political parties’ programs, Hooghe (2003) and Marks, 
Hooghe, Nelsen and Edwards (2006) have shown that euro-scepticism is U-shaped related to 
parties placed on a left-right scale: parties on both extremes of the political spectrum have 
rather strong anti-EU integration programs, whereas parties in the centre hold rather moderate 
EU views.  
Previous research paid some attention to the importance of resistance to European integration 
as related to the electoral growth of the far right in Europe, at least in some countries (Taggart 
2000). In her case studies of France and Denmark, Ivarsflaten (2005) showed that euro-
scepticism is an important determinant for far right political preferences, next to exclusionism 
and political disillusionment. Van der Burg, Fennema and Tillie (2005) showed that, at least 
in France, anti-EU attitudes induce voting for the extreme right-wing. As yet, few empirical 
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studies have studied the relationships between attitudes towards Europe and voting in national 
elections (Gabel 2000). In this study we question, firstly, to what extent euro-scepticism plays 
a role in voting for extremist parties, on both the far right and the far left, and in inducing non-
voting. Secondly, we aim to study the extent to which euro-scepticism, next to other political 
attitudes, explains why certain social categories are more likely to perform these types of 
voting behaviours. 
 
THEORIES 
 
In order to provide theoretically guided hypotheses as preliminary answers to the questions as 
posed above, we would like to stand on the shoulders of researchers who have previously 
focused on voting behaviour like Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet (1948), Downs (1957) and 
Lipset (1960). Whereas Lazarsfeld et al. emphasized the importance of group-related voting 
behavior, and Lipset emphasized particularly group interests, Downs argued that people 
evaluate parties by issues on their program and vote the party that corresponds most strongly 
with the issues they believe to be most important. Considering these approaches to be 
simultaneously relevant for voting behaviour, we may derive answers on the social cleavages 
that are still of importance for voting behaviour, as well as on socio-political determinants that 
may explain different voting preferences between these groups. This theoretical endeavour 
has been successfully applied in studies on far right-wing voting behaviour (Kitschelt 1995; 
Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers 2002; Ivarsflaten 2005). Now, we propose to apply this 
endeavour to explain voting for far left-wing parties, i.e., a classic question that has received 
far less attention in the recent past than voting for the far right. Few empirical studies exist on 
voting for the Italian Communists, the popular Danish Enhedslisten, or the French 
Communists, even though these parties are united in the European ‘Left Union’. The question 
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concerning  the extent to which euro-sceptic attitudes affect this voting has not yet been 
addressed in previous studies.  
Moreover, to the extent that euro-scepticism influences extreme (far right- or far left-) voting, 
we propose that it has an effect over and beyond previously identified determinants of these 
types of voting. This statement amounts to the simultaneous inclusion of other determinants in 
order to test rigorously for the non-spurious effect of euro-scepticism on voting, as suggested 
by Gabel (2000). In a similar vein, Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) have stressed that euro-
scepticism should affect voting behaviour in addition to left-right placement as a separate 
factor. We expect it to be such a separate determinant, because political parties – and not only 
those at the extremes – treat the EU as a special topic in their programs, thereby appealing to 
electoral sentiments, just as the theme of immigration and integration made inroads in 
political party programs in the 1980s. 
 
Euro-scepticism as an additional explanation for far right-wing voting 
 
Previous research has provided us with overwhelming evidence that underprivileged social 
categories are more likely to vote for far right-wing parties (Kitschelt 1995; Lubbers, 
Gijsberts  & Scheepers 2002). To explain why these particular social categories, like lowly 
educated people and people living on low incomes, are more likely to vote for the far right, 
specific theories have been developed, of which ethnic group conflict theory may be 
considered rather successful (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn & Scheepers 2004). This theory, building 
on realistic conflict theories, proposes that particularly underprivileged people are more likely 
to vote for far right-wing parties, that claim to protect their (economic) interests, because 
underprivileged people perceive themselves to be threatened by ethnic immigrants with whom 
they share social conditions (Lubbers et al. 2002; Ivarsflaten 2005). These far right-wing 
 5 
parties not only claim to protect threatened economic interests, but they might appeal to these 
underprivileged people by claiming that European integration is another, yet political, threat 
that eventually may reduce vital national traditions. The Union’s creation of European 
citizenship, captured in various symbolic expressions such as a unified currency, a European 
passport, a European flag, anthem and even a Europe Day, may increase people’s fears over 
losses of national traditions and the nation’s sovereignty. Considering previous research 
showing that particularly underprivileged people in many countries attach great value to 
national traditions, chauvinism and patriotism (Coenders, Gijsberts & Scheepers 2004), 
appealing to euro-scepticism may effectively encourage underprivileged people to vote for 
these far right-wing parties. Moreover, strong correlations between perceived threat from 
immigrants and euro-scepticism have been shown in previous research (McLaren 2002; Díez 
Medrano 2004; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2006).  
To ascertain the importance of euro-scepticism for voting for the far right-wing, we propose 
that it could have an effect, in addition to perceived threat from immigrants, even after 
controlling for other relevant determinants like authoritarianism, attachment to traditions, and 
political distrust (Kitschelt 1995; Billiet & De Witte 1995; Jackman & Volpert 1996; Knigge 
1996; Mayer 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers 2002; Golder 2003; Van der Brug, 
Fennema & Tillie 2005; Veugelers & Magnan 2005). This boils down to the general 
hypothesis that particularly less privileged people are more likely to be euro-sceptical 
(Anderson & Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998; De Winter & Swyngedouw 1999; Díez Medrano 
2003) – which in turn is expected to explain partially why lower educated people, manual 
workers and lower income categories are more likely to vote far right-wing parties. 
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Euro-scepticism as additional explanation for far left-wing voting 
 
Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) have focused on the relation between social class and 
(multinomial) party choice, including the communist parties, separately from the social-
democratic parties. Voting for the left is mostly considered in terms of socio-economic 
cleavages on economic distributions, with communist parties taking the most extreme 
positions. Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) have shown that – particularly for the Western 
European electorates – manual workers are more likely to vote for parties on the far left of the 
political spectrum. Moreover, political preferences for egalitarianism go some way to 
explaining this party preference (Gijsberts & Nieuwbeerta 2000). Voting for the far left-wing 
is interpreted in terms of class interests as well (Lipset 1960). People in disadvantaged or 
underprivileged positions prefer more government interference to establish more social 
equality for their benefit. As many of the far left-wing parties have expressed their concern 
with the capitalist and non-egalitarian direction of the EU (Hooghe 2003; Beichelt 2004), 
euro-scepticism could also effectively attract manual workers and hence explain additionally 
their political preferences for the far left. As it has been shown that particularly less privileged 
people are more euro-sceptical, we expect that euro-scepticism may additionally explain their 
likelihood to vote for the far left. We expect, and therefore test, whether the effect holds, in 
addition to other possible explanations of far left voting, in particular  attitudes on 
egalitarianism (Gijsberts & Nieuwbeerta 2000). 
 
Euro-scepticism as additional explanation for non-voting 
 
The extensive body of research on electoral participation has provided firm evidence that non-
voting is explained by theories on cognitive mobilization and social integration (Lane and 
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Ersson 1990; Smeenk, De Graaf & Ultee 1995; Oppenhuis 1995; Van Egmond, De Graaf & 
Van der Eijk 1998; Anduiza 2002; Franklin 2002; Rubenson et al. 2004; Martikainen et al. 
2005). Politics is a complicated field. Previous research has found that the less people are 
capable of understanding politics, the more likely they are to abstain from voting. 
Empirically, this has been assessed by effects of education and political efficacy (Van 
Egmond et al. 1998; Martikainen, Martikainen & Wass 2005).  
Theories focusing on social integration propose that people who are integrated into 
intermediary institutions, are more likely to show commitments to society, or at least to 
promote their institutions’ interest in society (Van Egmond et al. 1998). Such commitment 
increases electoral participation, which has been shown most convincingly for religious 
versus non-religious people, the latter abstaining much more strongly from voting (Van 
Egmond 2003). As well as political understanding and incentives from intermediary groups, 
people need to have trust if they are going to vote. If they distrust the politicians and distrust 
the political system in general, they will be less likely to vote. Such political cynicism has 
been found in the past to increase abstention (Rubenson et al. 2004). Dissatisfaction with the 
government is considered to increase people’s likelihood to choose to vote for competing 
opposition parties. For specific issues, we do not expect much variation between voters and 
non-voters, as long as there is enough choice between competing parties. Hooghe (2003) has 
shown that in many European countries, most parties hardly differ in their program with 
respect to the EU, except for some of the more extreme parties. If euro-scepticism is a motive 
in voting decisions, but people consider the far left or far right to be too extreme, euro-
scepticism may induce people to abstain from voting, also in national elections. 
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DATA 
 
Data were derived from the European Social Survey (ESS 2004a). The ESS project is funded 
by the European Commission’s Fifth Framework Program, the European Science Foundation 
and academic funding bodies in participating countries. The ESS team emphasizes the 
exceptionally high methodological standards of the design and of the operation of the project. 
A precise data description is available (ESS 2004b; Jowell et al., 2003). Rigorous translation 
protocols were used, with respondent selection involving a strict random probability 
sampling. In most countries, face-to-face interviews were conducted and the response target 
aimed at was very high, i.e., 70%. In quite a few countries, the response rate was indeed 
higher than in previous data collections. Detailed information on country-specific samples can 
be found in the country reports as provided by the ESS team in the ESS Documentation 
Report 2002 / 2003 (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). We selected people above 18 to 
represent the actual electorate of European countries. 
 
MEASUREMENTS 
 
The dependent variable voting behaviour was constructed on the basis of the question whether 
people had voted in the last national elections and, if so, for which party they had voted. The 
answers were recoded into ‘did not vote’, ‘voted for a far left-wing party’, ‘voted for a far 
right-wing party’ or ‘voted for another party’. We used information from the European party 
families as well as from previous research on right-wing populism and left-wing parties. The 
European Left Union has been coded as the ‘far left’. The respective parties within this group 
have been attributed the most far left-wing scores in expert surveys (see Appendix 1), below 
the score of 2.5. There are three exceptions, though; the Finnish Communist Party, the Irish 
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‘Sinn  Fein’ and the Greek Coalition of the Left, that received less extreme evaluations. As 
the parties are affiliated to the European Left Union, we nevertheless included these parties. 
The far right-wing parties are not united in the European Parliament. Previous research has 
discussed extensively the question concerning which parties resemble each other and to what 
extent the parties differ (Evans 2005). All parties we distinguished to be far right-wing parties 
scored strongly on anti-immigrant stances. The Italian AN has previously been included by 
Van der Brug et al. (2005), but some Italian researchers argued that it should be dropped 
(Ignazi 2003), an argument that has been followed by Lubbers et al. (2002) and was 
confirmed also with an expert survey. The parties are listed in Appendix 1. Of interest here is 
that the voters of the far left-wing parties themselves score further to the left-wing side than 
voters on the right do so on the right-wing side. On average, the far left-wing voters place 
themselves at 2.6, whereas the far right-wing voters place themselves at 6.4 (on a scale 
running from 0 to 10). People who did not remember which party they had voted for (4.4%) 
or did not want to say which party they had voted for (10.8%) were removed from the 
analyses.
1
 
To measure educational attainment we used information on the highest educational level of 
the respondent in years. In order to assign a numerical value for the respondents who were 
still studying at the time of the survey, we took their study duration at the time of the 
interview. The years of education were categorized into five categories: 8 years of education 
or less; 9-10 years of education; 11-12 years of education; 13-15 years of education; and 16 or 
more years of education. The social class measurement follows the EGP classification 
(Erikson et al. 1983), but we additionally distinguished cultural specialists from technical 
specialists as proposed by Güveli et al. (2005).
2
 
Monthly net-household income was measured using a standard number of categories with 
standard ranges. Country-specific coding schemes were used only for Ireland and Hungary. 
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The ESS documentation provided information on how to make the country-specific coding 
congruent with the standard coding. To compare incomes between countries, for each country 
separately, the mean income was set to one. Missing values for household income were – for 
each country separately – imputed by an estimated value based on other information that was 
available for the respondents. We estimated missing income values by means of a regression 
analysis of household income on four variables that are related to household income. 
We used information on religious attendance, which we categorized into ‘never’, ‘rarely’, 
‘once a month’ and ‘once a month or more’. Gender is coded such that women are the 
reference category with which men are compared. For age, we included a quadratic term to 
test on differences between elderly, middle-aged and young people. 
 
Measurements of socio-political attitudes 
 
Measurements of euro-scepticism refer to resistance to transferring eventual decisions on 
policies from the nation state to the EU administration in Brussels, referred to as political 
euro-scepticism (Hooghe, 2003; De Winter & Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 
2005) and distrust in the European Parliament. The former indicates the extent to which 
people prefer the sovereign nation state to decide on eight varying policies. The latter is 
measured with a single item, indicating distrust in the EP. There are no measurements 
available on instrumental euro-scepticism or measurements indicating people’s preference to 
turn their back on the EU completely. The two constructed measurements correlate only .10, 
warranting a reference to different aspects of the evaluation of the EU. 
To control for other attitudes that have been proven to be relevant determinants of voting 
behaviour in previous research, we constructed various scales. The objections towards 
European immigrants was measured by two items, asking to what extent people think 
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immigrants from either poorer or richer European countries should be allowed to enter the 
country. As the two items correlated .65, we took the items together as one measurement of 
attitude towards European immigrants. To have a measurement that evaluates immigrants in 
general, we computed a scale of perceived ethnic threat, combining six items on the extent to 
which  people believe immigrants pose a threat to economy and culture (‘immigrants take 
jobs away versus create new jobs’, ‘immigrants take more services out versus put more 
services in than they take out’, ‘immigration is bad versus good for the economy’, ‘the 
country’s cultural life is undermined versus enriched by immigrants’, ‘immigrants make the 
country a worse versus better place to live’, ‘immigrants make crime problems worse versus 
better’). These six items turned out to form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .84). People 
were also asked to what extent they believe it is important to follow customs and traditions 
and to what extent it is better for a country that everyone shares customs and traditions. These 
items were used to measure attachment to traditions. The items measuring attitudes towards 
European immigrants, perceived ethnic threat and attachment to traditions were factor 
analyzed. These analyses provided evidence that the three scales are empirically distinct. 
Political distrust was measured using four items (‘politicians in general care what people like 
respondent think’; ‘politicians are interested in votes rather than in peoples’ opinions’; ‘trust 
in country’s parliament’; and ‘trust in politicians’). The items were transformed into items 
with similar scale lengths, running from 0 to 10, where 10 means ‘no trust’. After factor 
analyses had shown the uni-dimensionality of the items and reliability analyses had provided 
satisfactory statistics (Cronbach’s alpha = .76), we computed one scale of political distrust, by 
taking the mean of the scores on the four items. Dissatisfaction with the government was 
measured straightforwardly on a ten-point scale. Similarly, people were asked their 
dissatisfaction with the state of the country’s economy. Political efficacy was measured by 
four items (‘politics is too complicated to understand’, ‘could take an active role in a group 
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involved in political issues’, ‘hard to make my mind up about political issues’ and ‘political 
interest’) constituting a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .70).  
Support for law and order was measured as a proxy for authoritarianism with four items (‘the 
law should always be obeyed’, ‘important to do what is told and follow rules’, ‘important that 
the government is strong and ensures safety’, ‘important to behave properly’). The items were 
transformed into similar scale lengths. Reliability analyses showed that the items formed a 
satisfactory scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .64). Support for economic egalitarianism was 
measured using two items we took together (‘the government should reduce income 
differentials’ and ‘employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions’). Support 
for social egalitarianism was constructed using four items (Cronbach’s alpha = .67; 
importance of ‘treating people equally’, ‘to understand different people’, ‘to help people and 
care for others’ well-being’ and ‘to be loyal to friends’).3 The two measures on egalitarianism 
were factorially distinct. The scale of achievement values was constructed out of three items 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .71; importance of  ‘to be rich, have money and expensive things’, ‘to 
show abilities and be admired’ and ‘to be successful and that people recognize 
achievements’).  
 
ANALYSES 
 
To test our hypotheses we used multilevel multinomial logistic modelling (Snijders and 
Bosker 1999). We included all countries. The analyses provide evidence for variance at the 
country level. Estimated parameters indicate the likelihood to vote for either the far left, the 
far right or not to vote versus another centre party choice in Europe. All ordinal and interval 
variables have been transformed into z-scores (e.g. the mean set to zero and standard 
deviation of one), making comparisons of strength of effects possible. We started with a 
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model only including background characteristics to find out which social categories are more 
likely to vote for the far left, the far right or to abstain from voting. In the second model, the 
results of the inclusion of the socio-political attitudes are presented. Moreover, we present to 
what extent the effects of socio-political attitudes on voting far left, far right and non-voting 
are confounded by left-right self-placement. As we are interested in the question concerning 
to what extent particular socio-political attitudes explain the likelihood that certain social 
categories vote for each of the distinguished party families or abstain from voting, we present 
in another table the consequences of dropping the socio-political attitudes one by one for the 
parameter estimates of some of the background characteristics. 
 
RESULTS 
 
At the bottom of Table 1 in model 1 we present the country variance parameters of the 
likelihood to vote for the far left, or for the far right and non-voting versus voting for another 
(centre) party. The three parameters are highly significant, which is not surprising, since the 
extent of support for far left and far right wing parties varies strongly between countries, as 
does non-voting. In this research we are, however, primarily interested in the individual level 
effects and the explanation of these effects. 
Education affects all three voting preferences. A higher education increases the likelihood to 
vote for the far left (B= .12), decreases the likelihood to vote for the far right (B= -.21) as well 
as decreasing the likelihood to abstain from voting (B= -.32) as compared to voting for 
another party. Social position contributes strongly to explaining the extreme voting 
preferences. Socio-cultural professionals (either high or low) differ from the higher technical 
professionals (i.e., the reference category): They are significantly more likely to prefer a far 
left-wing party, but significantly less likely to prefer a far right-wing party. Compared to the 
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technical professionals, we find that lower service and sales workers as well as skilled and 
unskilled manual workers are more likely to prefer a far left party. Regarding the vote for a 
far right-wing party, we find that routine non-manual workers, self-employed people (with or 
without employees), manual workers, their supervisors and farmers are more likely than 
technical professionals to vote for this party family. Compared to the technical professionals, 
most occupational categories are more likely to abstain from voting. 
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Table 1.  Multinomial models of the likelihood of voting far left-wing, far right-wing or non-
voting versus voting for another party. N = 30,373 
  Model 1   Model 2  
 FAR LEFT FAR RIGHT NO VOTE FAR LEFT FAR RIGHT NO VOTE 
Intercept -2.45 -3.11 -1.24 -2.93 -3.23 -1.47 
       
Individual characteristics       
Education (z) .12** -.21** -.32** .05 -.07 -.18** 
Social position       
 Higher technical professionals 
(reference) 
      
 Higher social-cultural .50** -1.06** -.19 .26 -.93** -.09 
 Lower technical professionals .20 .25~ .08 .10 .25~ .00 
 Lower social-cultural 
professionals 
.57** -.45** -.10 .27* -.31 -.09 
 Routine non-manual workers .07 .29*    .19**  .01 .24 .06 
 Lower service workers .57** .16 .34** .39** .21 .22** 
 Lower sales workers .45** .11 .51** .37**  .01 .35** 
 Self employed with employees -.26 .49** .22* -.12 .32 .16 
 Self employed without 
employees 
.06 .68** .27** -.03 .61** .14 
 Labor supervisors  .02 .54** .30** -.05 .47** .19~ 
 Skilled manual workers .50** .29* .57** .36** .14 .33** 
 Unskilled manual workers .54** .64** .56** .41** .54** .32** 
 Farmers/farm laborers .32~ .52** .33** .30 .32~ .12 
 Other (never had a job) -.04 .23 .54** -.07 .12 .40** 
       
Income       
 Lowest quartile       
 Second lowest quartile -.01 -.06 -.21** .07 -.02 -.17** 
 Second highest quartile -.10 -.16~ -.33** -.01 -.09 -.27** 
 Highest quartile -.27** -.19* -.31** -.08 -.09 -.20** 
       
Sex (men) -.12~ .25** -.19** -.09 .19**  .03 
Age (z) -.02 -.11** -.52**  .01 -.16** -.48** 
Age-squared -.01 .02 .26** .03 .04 .26** 
       
Church attendance       
 Once or more a week -1.81** -.70** -.87** -1.46** -.72** -.73** 
 Once a month -1.36** -.56** -.76** -1.08** -.48** -.60** 
 Once or twice a year -.60** -.20** -.44** -.40** -.21** -.35** 
 Never (reference)       
       
Intermediate characteristics       
Political euro-scepticism (z)    .06~ .14** .01 
Distrust in EP (z)    .19** .13** -.01 
Objection to EU immigrants (z)     .02 .14** .03 
Ethnic threat (z)    -.13** .44** .04 
Attachment to traditions (z)    -.20** .18** -.08** 
Support for law and order (z)    -.18** .02 -.07** 
Achievement values (z)    -.04 .02 .04** 
Economic egalitarianism (z)    .59** -.13** -.00 
Dissatisfaction with economy (z)    -.05 .04 .02 
Dissatisfaction with government (z)    .25** .02 -.01 
Political distrust (z)    -.02 .19** .33** 
Political efficacy (z)    .19**  .12** -.48** 
Social egalitarianism (z)    .14** -.13**  .00 
       
Variance components       
Level 2: country .974** 1.886** .318**  .998** 2.174** .294** 
Level 1: Individual 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
~ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01       
(z) = z-scores       
Source: ESS 2002/2003       
 
The parameter estimates for income categories are more or less similar for the three electoral 
options, although being strongest regarding non-voting. Compared with lower incomes, 
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higher incomes categories are less likely to prefer a far left-wing party, a far right-wing party, 
or to abstain from voting as compared to the lowest income category. 
Gender and age have no effect on voting for the far left. However, women tend to be 
somewhat more likely to prefer the far left, which is in contrast with the far right-wing 
preference that is more likely to be found among men as well as among younger people. Non-
voting is more likely among women than among men. Although previous research has shown 
that older people are less likely abstainers than younger people, the inclusion of the quadratic 
term of age shows that the likelihood to abstain increases again after a certain age. Finally, we 
included religiosity, which has a particularly strong effect. Frequent church attendees are less 
likely to vote for the far left (B = -1.81), are less likely to vote for the far right (B = -.70) and 
are less likely to abstain from voting (B = -.87) as compared to voting for the centre parties. 
In the second model of Table 1, we included relevant socio-political attitudes simultaneously. 
Of particular interest are the effects from political euro-scepticism and distrust in the 
European Parliament. We actually find that political euro-scepticism increases the likelihood 
to vote for the far right only (B = .14), whereas distrust in the EP increases both the likelihood 
to vote for the far left (B = .19) and for the far right (B = .13). There is no effect from either 
euro-scepticism or distrust in the EP on non-voting, thus refuting our expectations. 
Many other socio-political attitudes are significant and hence relevant, in line with previous 
research. Voting for the far left is strongly determined by economic egalitarianism (B = .59) 
and dissatisfaction with the government (B = .25). Moreover, the likelihood to vote for the far 
left increases the less people are attached to traditions (B = -.20), the higher their political 
efficacy (B = .19), the less they support law and order (B = -.18), the more they support social 
egalitarianism (B = .14) and the less they perceive ethnic threat (B = -.13). 
Far right-wing voting is most strongly determined by perceived ethnic threat (B = .44).  In 
addition to political euro-scepticism and distrust in the EP, the likelihood to vote for the far 
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right increases when people feel attached to traditions (B = .18), have more political distrust 
(B = .19), object to immigrants from the EU (B = .14), oppose economic and social 
egalitarianism (both B = -.13) and score higher on political efficacy (B = .12).  
The likelihood to abstain from voting increases when people feel less political efficacy (B = -
.48) and are more distrustful politically (B = .33). Moreover, attachment to traditions, support 
for law and order (B= -.08 respectively -.07) decrease the likelihood to abstain from voting. 
A general ideological left-right placement could confound the effects of euro-scepticism (e.g., 
Van der Eijk & Franklin 2004). Therefore, we additionally estimated a model including left-
right self placement. Only the new parameters of the socio-political attitudes are presented in 
Table 2. Comparing these effects with model 2 from Table 1 provides us the possibility to 
evaluate the consequences of including left-right placement. Regarding voting for the far left, 
distrust in EP turns out to have a smaller effect when we include left-right placement. For the 
far right however, the parameters of political euro-scepticism and distrust in the EP are hardly 
altered in the model where left-right placement has been included. This leads us to conclude 
that far right-wing voting in national elections is determined by euro-scepticism, in addition to 
various theoretically important explanations and left-right wing placement. Including left-
right placement reduces most strongly some effects on voting for the far left, in particular 
from economic egalitarianism, and to a smaller extent the effects from political efficacy, 
attachment to traditions and ethnic threat. 
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Table 2.  Parameter estimates and change of intermediate characteristics after inclusion of left-
right placement. N = 30,373 
Intermediate characteristics FAR LEFT FAR RIGHT NO VOTE 
  Parameter 
change 
 Parameter 
change 
 Parameter 
change 
Political euro-scepticism (z) .04 -.02 .13** -.01 .01 .00 
Distrust in EP (z) .10** -.09 .14** +.01 -.01  .00 
Objection to EU immigrants (z)  .06~ +.04 .14** -.01 .03 .00 
Ethnic threat (z) -.04 +.09 .38** -.06 .04 .00 
Attachment to traditions (z) -.12** +.08 .14** -.04 -.08** .00 
Support for law and order (z) -.15** +.03 -.01 -.03 -.07** .00 
Achievement values (z) -.02 +.02 .01 -.01 .05** .01 
Economic egalitarianism (z) .26** -.33 -.05 +.08 -.01 -.01 
Diss. with economy of country (z) -.06 -.01 .07 +.03 .02 .00 
Dissatisfaction with government (z) .15** -.10 .05 +.03  -.01 .00 
Political distrust (z)  .01 +.03 .17** -.02 .33** .00 
Political efficacy (z) .06 -.13 .07* -.05 -.48** .00 
Social egalitarianism (z) .10** -.04 -.10* +.03  .00 .00 
Left-right placement (z) -1.04** .46** -.04** 
~ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01    
Source: ESS 2002/2003    
 
To test the hypotheses that differences between privileged and less privileged social 
categories in the likelihood to vote for the far right-wing family parties are explained by euro-
scepticism, we refer to the parameter estimates in Table 3. This table presents the initial effect 
parameter in the likelihood to vote for the far right, not yet controlled for confounding 
attitudinal determinants. Next, a column of final parameters is presented, which represent the 
likelihood to vote for the far right, after controlling for all relevant socio-political attitudes. 
The six successive columns show what the parameter would have been, if we had included all 
socio-political attitudes except for the one mentioned in the column. This provides insights 
into the importance of this specific attitude to explain the likelihood of the listed social 
category to vote for the far right-wing. To facilitate the readers’ comprehension, we 
highlighted the cells which show a relevant parameter change. 
Our hypotheses read that particularly less privileged people would be more likely to vote for a 
far right party because of their euro-sceptic attitude. Regarding education, we found a 
negative effect on voting for the far right; the higher the people’s education, the less likely 
they vote for the far right. Exclusion of the euro-sceptic attitudes indeed increases the final 
parameter in strength; from -0.070 to -0.080. This implies that euro-scepticism explains partly 
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why education affects voting for the far right. However, its relevance is limited. The 
importance of ethnic threat and objections to immigrants from within the EU explains more 
strongly why lower educated people are more likely to vote for the far right. Next, we focus 
on  manual workers who were found to be more likely to vote for the far right. The difference 
is, however, not explained by euro-scepticism, but rather by perceived ethnic threat and 
objections to immigrants that explain the likelihood more strongly. A limited interpretation is 
provided by the importance of tradition and law and order, and political distrust, which 
prevail somewhat more strongly among manual workers than among technical specialists. 
Why higher income categories are less likely to vote for the far right compared to the lowest 
income categories is relatively well explained by euro-scepticism. Higher income categories 
are less euro-sceptic and hence less likely to vote for the far right in national elections. Higher 
income categories perceive less ethnic threat and have fewer objections to immigrants from 
the EU, thereby explaining their lower likelihood to vote for the far right. 
 
Table 3.  Parameters explaining voting for the far right-wing, excluding one attitude or set of 
attitudes; N = 30,373 
 Initial 
model 
Final 
model 
Political 
euro-
scepticism 
and distrust 
in EP 
Ethnic threat 
and objection 
EU immigrants 
Attachment 
to tradition 
and support 
for law and 
order 
Political 
distrust and 
dissatisfaction 
with 
government 
Political 
efficacy 
Dissatisfaction 
with economy 
and economic 
egalitarianism 
Education -.214 -.070 -.080 -.128 -.075 -.076 -.054 -.057 
Manual 
workers 
.643 .543 .539 .616 .551 .557 .505 .484 
Highest 
income 
-.191 -.095 -.117 -.127 -.100 -.097 -.078 -.057 
Source: ESS 2002/2003 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this contribution, we have focused on the crucial question concerning to what extent euro-
scepticism affects the electorate’s preferences to vote for parties at the far ends of the political 
spectrum. Having the huge advantage of high-quality, cross-national data for many European 
countries, analyzed using advanced methodological tools, we now may provide a rather firm 
answer to this question. We have found that voting for the far right and for the far left at 
national elections are to some extent explained by euro-scepticism, over and beyond other 
relevant socio-political attitudes. These findings show that the sleeping giant of ‘European 
Integration’ has awakened to become a relevant electoral force. Moreover, we have found 
evidence for the hypotheses that euro-scepticism explains why low educated people and 
people with lower incomes are more likely to vote for the far right in Western Europe as an 
answer to our second question. Euro-scepticism does not, however, play a role with regard to 
non-voting in national elections. 
We also have to conclude, however, that euro-scepticism continues to be a dwarf as compared 
to other socio-political stances that determine voting preferences. It turns out that the 
previously proposed explanations for far left-wing voting and far right-wing voting are more 
important than euro-scepticism. Far left-wing voting is determined most strongly by attitudes 
on economic egalitarianism and dissatisfaction with the government. Far right-wing voting is 
determined most strongly by perceptions of ethnic threat and attachment to traditions. The 
main determinants of non-voting are political efficacy and political distrust. 
In terms of background characteristics, considered to be important indicators of social 
cleavages, education turns out to be very important for the voting outcomes. Having attained a 
high educational level increases the likelihood of voting for the far left and decreases the 
likelihood of voting for the far right or staying home at the elections. Having a higher income 
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decreases the likelihood of voting for either of the extremist options. We found that manual 
workers, as compared to higher professionals, are more likely to vote for either the far left or 
for the far right, and are more likely to abstain from voting. The political party family that 
these manual workers prefer is strongly dependent on their stances on economic and political 
issues. Those who perceive ethnic minorities to be a threat and object to immigrants are more 
likely to vote for the far right parties rather than the far left parties. Those who support 
egalitarianism instead are more likely to vote for the far left parties rather than the far right 
parties. Within the higher professional groups we found differences between cultural and 
technical specialists. The cultural specialists (both higher and lower) are more inclined to vote 
for the far left and least likely to vote for the far right. Religion as an intermediate social 
power restrains people in voting for either of the extremes as compared to voting for the 
centre parties. 
The scientific discussion regarding whether euro-scepticism contributes to explain extreme 
voting behaviour next to the left-right dimension can be answered positively. We tested the 
importance of euro-scepticism, not only controlled for the left-right-wing dimension, but for 
other relevant socio-political attitudes taken into account in previous research to explain far 
right-wing voting, far left-wing voting and non-voting. Testing these full, and hence complex, 
models revealed that political euro-scepticism and dissatisfaction with the European 
Parliament affect far right-wing and far left-wing voting, additionally to other characteristics. 
 
LITERATURE 
 
Anderson, Christopher. J., & M.S. Reichert. (1996). Economic benefits and support for 
membership in the E.U.: A cross-national analysis. Journal of Public Politics, 15, 3, 231-249. 
 
 22 
Anduiza, E. (2002). Individual characteristics, institutional incentives and electoral abstention 
in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 41, 5, 643-73.  
 
Billiet, Jaak & Hans de Witte. (1995). Attitudinal dispositions to vote for a new extreme right-
wing party: The case of the ‘Vlaams Blok’. European Journal of Political Research, 27, 2, 
181-202. 
 
Beichelt, Timm. (2004). Euro-Scepticism in the EU Accession Countries. Comparative 
European Politics, 2, 1, 29-50. 
 
Brug, van der W., F. Fennema & J. Tillie. (2005). Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and 
others succeed. A two-step model of aggregate electoral support. Comparative Political 
Studies, 38, 5, 537-73. 
 
Coenders, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, & Peer Scheepers. (2004). Chauvinism and patriotism in 
22 countries. In M. Gijsberts, L. Hagendoorn & P. Scheepers (Eds.), Nationalism and 
exclusionism of migrants. Cross-national comparisons. Pp. 29-70. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
De Vreese, Cleas & Hajo G. Boomgaarden. (2005). Projecting EU Referendums. Fear of 
immigration and support for European Integration. European Union Politics, 6, 1, 59-82. 
 
De Winter, Lieven, & Marc Swyngedouw. (1999). The Scope of EU Government. In H. 
Schmitt and J. Thomassen (Eds.), Political representation and legitimacy in the European 
Union. Pp. 47-73. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 23 
Díez Medrano, Juan. (2003). Framing Europe. Attitudes to European integration in Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Egmond, Marcel van, Nan Dirk De Graaf, & Cees van der Eijk. (1998). Electoral participation 
in the Netherlands: Individual and Contextual Influences. European Journal of Political 
Research, 34, 2, 281-300. 
 
Egmond, Marcel van. (2003). Rain falls on all of us but some manage to get more wet than 
others. Political context and electoral participation. Nijmegen: KUN/ICS. 
 
Eijk, Cees van der, & Mark N. Franklin. (2004). Potential for contestation on European 
matters at national elections in Europe. In European Integration and Political Conflict. Pp. 
32-50. Eds. G. Marks and M. R. Steenbergen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Erikson, Robert, John H. Goldthorpe, & Lucienne Portocarero. (1983). Intergenerational class 
mobility and the convergence thesis in England, France and Sweden. British Journal of 
Sociology, 34, 3, 303-343. 
 
European Social Survey. (2004a.) ESS data file, version 4.1. Retrieved January 2004 from the 
World Wide Web: http://ess.nsd.uib.no. 
 
European Social Survey. (2004b). ESS survey documentation and fieldwork documents. 
Retrieved January 2004 from the World Wide Web: http://ess.nsd.uib.no. 
 24 
 
Evans, J. A.J. (2005). The dynamics of social change in radical right-wing populist party 
support. Comparative European Politics, 3, 1, 76-101. 
 
Franklin, Mark N. (2002). The dynamics of electoral participation. In: L. Le Duc, R.G. Niemi 
and P. Norris (Eds.), Comparing democracies 2: New challenges in the study of elections and 
voting. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Gabel, Matthew J. (2000). European integration, voters and national policies. West European 
Politics, 23, 4, 52-72. 
 
Gabel, Matthew J. (1998). Public support for European Integration: an empirical test of five 
theories. The Journal of Politics, 60, 2, 333-54. 
 
Gijsberts, Mérove & Nieuwbeerta, Paul. (2000). Class cleavages in party preferences in the 
new democracies in Eastern Europe. A comparison with Western democracies’, European 
Societies, 2, 4, 397-430. 
 
Gijsberts, Mérove, Hagendoorn, Louk & Scheepers, Peer. (2004). Nationalism and 
exclusionism of migrants. Cross-National Comparisons. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
 
Golder, M. (2003). Explaining variation in the success of extreme right-wing parties in 
Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 36, 4, 432-466. 
 
 25 
Güveli, Ayse, Need, Ariana & De Graaf, Nan Dirk. (2005). De opkomst van de ‘nieuwe’ 
sociale klassen binnen de dienstenklasse in Nederland. Politieke oriëntatie van de ‘nieuwe’ 
sociale klassen tussen 1970 en 2000. Mens & Maatschappij, 80, 3, 257-79. 
 
Hooghe, Liesbet. (2003). Europe Divided? Elites vs. Public Opinion on European Integration. 
European Union Politics, 4, 281-304. 
 
Ignazi, Piero. (2003). Extreme right parties in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. (2005). The vulnerable populist right parties: no economic realignment 
fuelling their economic success. European Journal of Political Research, 44, 3, 465-92. 
 
Jackman, R.W. & Volpert, K. (1996). Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in 
Western Europe. British Journal of Political Science, 26, 4, 501-21. 
 
Jowell, Roger, & the Central coordinating team. (2003). European Social Survey: Technical 
Report. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University. 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert. (1995). The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Knigge, Pia. (1998). The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. 
European Journal of Political Research, 34, 2, 249-79. 
 
 26 
Lane, J.E. & S. Ersson. (1990). Macro and micro understanding in political science: What 
explains electoral participation? European Journal of Political Research, 18, 4, 457-465. 
 
Lazersfeld, P.F., Berelson, B. & Gaudet, H. (1948). The people’s choice. How the voter makes 
up his mind in a presidential campaign. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Lipset, Seymour (1960). Political Man. New York: Doubleday and Company. 
 
Lubbers, Marcel. (2001). Exclusionistic electorates. Extreme right-wing voting in Western 
Europe. Nijmegen: KUN/ICS. 
 
Lubbers, Marcel, Gijsberts, Mérove & Scheepers, Peer. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in 
Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 41, 3, 345-78.  
 
Lubbers, Marcel, & Scheepers, Peer. (2005). Political versus instrumental euro-scepticism: 
mapping scepticism in European countries and regions. European Union Politics, 6, 2, 223-
42. 
 
Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet, Nelson, Moira & Edwards, Erica. (2006). Party competition 
and European integration in the East and West: different structure, same causality. 
Comparative Political Studies, 39, 2, 155-75. 
 
Martikainen, Pekka, Martikainen, Tuomo & Wass, Hanna. (2005). The effect of 
socioeconomic factors on voter turnout in Finland: A register-based study of 2.9 million 
voters. European Journal of Political Research, 44, 5, 645-669. 
 27 
 
Mayer, Nonna. (1996). The National Front vote and right-wing extremism, 1988-1995. 
Research on Democracy and Society, 3, 197-221. 
 
McLaren, Lauren M. (2002). Immigration and the new politics of inclusion and exclusion in 
the European Union: The effect of elites and the EU on individual-level opinions regarding 
European and non-European immigrants. European Journal of Political Research, 39, 1, 81-
108. 
 
McLaren, Lauren M. (2006). Identity, interests and attitudes to European integration. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Oppenhuis, Erik. (1995). Voting Behaviour in Europe. Amsterdam: Spinhuis. 
 
Rubenson, Daniel, Blais, André, Fournier, Patrick, Gidengil, Elisabeth & Vevitte, Neil. 
(2004). Accounting for the age gap in turnout. Acta Politica, 39, 4, 407-421. 
 
Smeenk, Wilma, De Graaf, Nan Dirk & Ultee, Wout (1995). Thuisblijven bij verkiezingen in 
Nederland en de Verenigde Staten. Mens en maatschappij, 70, 3, 220-42. 
 
Taggert, Paul. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Veugelers, John & Magnan, André. (2005). Conditions of far right strength in contemporary 
Western Europe: an application of Kitschelt’s theory. European Journal of Political 
Research, 44, 6, 837-860. 
 28 
Appendix 1.  Parties by country categorized into the far left and the far right, percentage of votes 
for respective parties and average left-right placement of voters for the parties in the 
ESS data. Percentage of non-voters. Within parentheses: the left- and right-wing 
scores based on an expert judgment survey, if available (Lubbers 2001) 
 Far left parties % LR Far right parties % LR Not 
voted 
FI Finland Vasemmistoliitto (Left 
Alliance) (1.9) 
Suomen Kommunistinen 
Puolue 
(Communist Party of 
Finland) (3.2) 
7.0 2.7    17.8 
SE Sweden Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) 
(2.2) 
9.5 2.2    12.1 
NO Norway Rød Valgallianse (Red 
Electoral Alliance) (2.0) 
Sosialistisk Venstreparti 
(Socialist Left Party) (2.2) 
13.8 3.5 Fremskrittspartiet (Progress 
Party) (8.1) 
15.9 6.7 14.6 
DK 
Denmark 
Enhedslisten (Unity List) 
(1.0) 
1.6 1.6 Dansk Folkeparti (Danish 
People’s Party) (8.7) 
Fremskridtspartiet (Progress 
Party) (8.7) 
8.2 6.5 5.5 
GB Great 
Britain 
      26.9 
IE Ireland Sinn Fein/‘We 
Ourselves’(3.2) 
4.0 4.0    19.4 
NL The 
Netherlands 
Socialistische Partij 
(Socialist Party) (1.4) 
6.7 3.4 Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim 
Fortuyn) 
13.6 6.3 12.7 
BE Belgium Partij van de Arbeid 
(Labour Party) 
Parti des Travailleurs de 
Belgique (Belgian Labour 
Party) 
0.4 0.7 Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc) 
(9.3) 
Front National (9.5) 
7.0 6.2 10.7 
LU 
Luxemburg 
Déi Lénk (The Left) (1.3) 1.7 2.0    14.2 
DE 
Germany 
Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus (Party of 
Democratic Socialism) 
(1.6) 
7.1 2.7 Die Republikaner 
(Republicans) (8.7) 
0.5 6.8 12.5 
AT Austria    Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Freedom party 
of Austria) (8.5) 
5.5 6.2 11.8 
CH 
Switzerland 
   Schweizerische VolksPartei 
(Swiss People’s Party) (8.4) 
Lega dei Ticinese (League of 
Ticinesians) (9.0) 
SchweizerDemokraten 
(Swiss Democrats) (9.1) 
Freiheitspartei (Freedom 
Party) (8.9) 
19.2 6.1 29.5 
FR France Communiste 
Revolutionaire 
(Revolutionary 
Communists) 
Parti Communiste  (1.5) 
(Communist Party) 
Lutte ouvrière (Workers’ 
Struggle) 
Mouvement des citoyens  
(Citizens’ movement) 
8.2 2.5 Front National (9.5) 
Mouvement National 
Republicain (National 
Republican Movement) 
7.2 5.8 24.4 
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ES Spain Izquierda Unida (United 
Left) (2.5) 
5.3 2.7 19.2 
PT Portugal Bloco de Esquerda (Left 
Bloc)  
Partido Comunista 
Portugues (Portuguese 
Communists) (2.2) 
Partido Comunista dos  
Trabalhadores (Communist 
Party of workers) 
11.5 2.3    24.7 
IT Italy Communisti Italiani 
(Italian Communists) 
Rifondazione Comunista 
(Communist 
Refoundation) (0.7) 
7.2 2.3 Lega Nord (Northern 
League) (7.6) 
Fiamma tricolore (Three 
Colored Flame) (9.7) 
2.2 6.0 10.1 
GR Greece Kommounistiko Komma 
Ellado (Communist party 
of Greece) (1.6) 
Sinaspismos tis Aristeras 
ke ti Proodu (Coalition of 
the Left) (3.7) 
7.8 2.0    7.3 
PO Poland    Liga Polskich Rodzin 
(League of Polish Families) 
5.0 7.4 32.3 
CZ Czech 
Republic 
Komunistická Strana Čech 
a Morava (Communist 
Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia) 
9.8 2.4 Republikanská Morislav 
Sladek (Republicans of 
Miroslav Sladek) 
Pravý blok (Right Bloc) 
0.2 9.3 35.5 
HU 
Hungary 
Munkáspárt (Workers' 
Party) 
0.9 2.3 Magyar Igazság és Elet 
Pártja (Hungarian Justice 
and Life Party) 
1.4 6.0 17.3 
SI Slovenia    Slovenska Nacionalna 
Stranka (Slovenian National 
Party) 
2.8 5.0 19.0 
%  = Percentage (in data) voted for the respective parties 
LR   = Left-right placement (ranging from 0 to 10) of the voters for the respective parties 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 Variation between countries is large concerning the extent to which people refused an answer or did not 
remember the party they voted for. The sum of refusing and the don’t know category is smallest in the 
Netherlands, and largest in Italy. Refusing an answer is more likely among lower educated people, the highest 
income group and religious people. Moreover, socio-cultural specialists, self-employed people and people who 
never had a job also more often refuse an answer. Women, lower educated people and religious people do not 
remember what party they voted for, more often than others. 
2
 For Norway, no information was collected among the self-employed about their supervision. So, for Norway, 
we could not distinguish between self-employed with or without employees. The French data provided ISCO 
codes in two-digits only. Consequently, this produces a somewhat different coding than for the other countries. 
In particular, the category of routine non-manuals is larger. The category of lower sales persons is lacking for 
France. 
3
 The pro-social attitude scale is an average constant in Luxemburg and Italy, as the items were not included in 
the surveys in these two countries. 
